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ABSTRACT
Comparing Theoretical Explanations Regarding United States Decision-Making on
Regime Change in Peru and in Chile from 1968 to 1973
by
Lauren Roberts, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2021

Major Professor: Dr. Jeannie Johnson
Department: Political Science
Given the failure of system-level theories to account for the difference in the US
actions towards Peru and Chile from 1968 to 1973, the research sought a state-level
analysis. This thesis examined the conventional wisdom that the CIA is a regime change
advocate by testing the merits of two competing state-level analysis constructs, one
focused on internal (endogenous) influences within CIA and one focused on external
(exogenous) pressures on CIA emanating from the American public and elected officials.
Of the two hypotheses, public choice theory, which focused on the external
pressure on the CIA, offers the most potential as an explanatory tool for CIA involvement
in regime change. While cultural variables were identified in an examination of memoirs
and government documents, there was no consistency across the two cases. Through
analysis of external pressures, CIA efforts matched what the public’s, the president’s, and
Congress’s attention was focused on—Chile and not Peru.
(79 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Comparing Theoretical Explanations Regarding United States Decision-Making on
Regime Change in Peru and in Chile from 1968 to 1973
Lauren Roberts

This thesis examined the common idea that the CIA is a regime change advocate
by testing the merits of two competing political science theories, one focused on internal
(endogenous) influences within CIA and one focused on external (exogenous) pressures
on CIA emanating from the American public and elected officials. This was
accomplished through two case studies – one where the CIA conducted covert regime
change operations and one where it did not. Of the two hypotheses, public choice theory,
which focused on the external pressure on the CIA, offers the most potential as an
explanatory tool for CIA involvement in regime change. While cultural variables were
identified in an examination of memoirs and government documents, there was no
consistency across the two cases. Through analysis of external pressures, CIA efforts
matched what the public’s, the president’s, and Congress’s attention was focused on—
Chile and not Peru.
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INTRODUCTION

The US has a long history of pursuing regime change in an attempt to create
conditions favorable to US interests. Since its creation in 1947, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) has been the most consistent tool of choice when these efforts have been
covert. Despite the international ire this method provokes, the US has continued to pursue
regime change as a viable policy option. While the most often cited cases of US attempts
of regime change occurred during the Cold War, since its end in 1990, the US has
conducted regime change operations in multiple countries, including Haiti, Afghanistan,
Libya, Syria, and Iraq. Most recently, during Operation Timber Sycamore from 2013 to
2017, the CIA armed and trained rebels in the Syrian civil war. Because of the continued
relevance of regime change as a US policy option, it is important to understand the
factors that contribute to ongoing policy support for this intensely controversial, and
highly consequential, incursion of state sovereignty.
In explaining US regime change policy in Latin America and elsewhere, both
conventional wisdom and the bulk of scholarly literature examining CIA activity from the
1950s–1970s condemn the CIA for carrying out regime changes that damaged the
development of democracy and long-term stability for the country in question, and its
relationship with the US. The CIA tends to be portrayed as a knee-jerk regime change
advocate when US interests were threatened by governments sympathetic to the Soviet
Union and its practices. Typical of this sentiment are the comments of Arthur
Schlesinger, who served as special assistant and historian during President John F.
Kennedy’s administration and reflected in 1994 about US actions in a regime change
operation in Guyana (then British Guiana) in the 1960s:
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We misunderstood the whole struggle down there. He wasn’t a
Communist. The British thought we were overreacting, and indeed we
were. The C.I.A. decided this was some great menace, and they got the bit
between their teeth. But even if British Guiana had gone Communist, it’s
hard to see how it would be a threat. (Weiner 1994)
It is important to note that the CIA does not have full autonomy over its
operations due to presidential oversight (Roberts 2009). Indeed, the decision to conduct a
covert operation is the responsibility of the president; at the same time the CIA is often
the scapegoat and occupies a peculiar place in the policy-making process as one who
informs the decision and then carries out the decision. “Although covert actions represent
a very small fraction of the Agency’s entire budget, these operations have at times been
controversial and over time have dominated the public’s perception of the CIA” (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004, 86). The CIA and regime
change are irrefutably linked in the minds of the public, academia, and the government,
and few scholars focus on a critical examination of that link, analyzing what part the
president and the CIA each play. Books such as Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of
the CIA, Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since WWII, US Presidents
and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War, Covert
Regime Change, and CIA and the Third World and journal articles including “What
Really Happened in Chile: The CIA, the Coup Against Allende, and the Rise of
Pinochet,” “Interfering with civil society: CIA and KGB covert political action during the
Cold War,” and the “CIA’s Holy War” alternate between a near exclusive focus on the
CIA or the president without attention to the interplay between them and their respective
individual contributions to policy decisions.
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The overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 and of Mohammad
Mossadeq in Iran in 1953 are often considered the beginning of the link between the CIA
and its use as a policy tool to carry out regime change operations. Speaking on
Guatemala, one scholar states,
In method, scale, and conception it had no antecedent, and its triumph
confirmed the belief of many in the Eisenhower administration that covert
operations offered a safe, inexpensive substitute for armed force in
resisting Communist inroads in the Third World. (Cullather 2006, 7)
It wasn’t just the political administration that thought the events in Guatemala and Iran
were noteworthy, however. Shortly after the events of both operations, the CIA itself
leaked details to journalists Richard and Gladys Harkness (Prados 2006, 122). In
response, Richard Harkness wrote a letter to Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen
Dulles stating, “We sifted into the manuscript your suggestions for giving the story a
constructive quality by pointing out the Red gains through subversion, and the fact that
CIA is the agency to combat those tactics” (13 August 1954, Allen W. Dulles Papers). As
one scholar noted, this correspondence suggests that “Dulles actively sought publicity for
covert action, presumably to build support in Congress for the agency’s budget as well as
to augment its reputation for invincibility and cleverness” (Zirinsky 1995, 361). Figures
both within and outside of the CIA attributed ownership of regime change operations to
the Agency. Success in Guatemala and Iran helped to set up a path for covert operations
to continue being a favored method by presidential administrations and the CIA to
combat communism throughout the next few decades. The most comprehensive database
of US-backed regime change attempts during the Cold War (1947–1989) includes 64
covert interventions and only 6 overt ones (O’Rourke 2018, 2–3).
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This thesis proposes a first step in testing the widely held assertion that
institutional support for regime change within the CIA was a determining factor in the US
pursuit of regime change during the Cold War era. To be clear, this research is not
intended to discuss the ethics of US intervention in the affairs of foreign countries nor to
what extent the actions of the CIA are responsible for the consequent outcome of regime
change in foreign countries. Instead, it is a first step in assessing whether exogenous or
endogenous factors played a greater role in shaping CIA involvement in regime change
operations. The contribution this thesis makes toward that goal is to compare the impact
of the endogenous factor of CIA organizational culture as it pertains to institutional
decision-making on regime change policy against the exogenous factors examined
through public choice theory as it pertains to bureaucratic behavior.
With this objective in mind, operations of the CIA in South America reveal an
interesting puzzle. The US, through the CIA, attempted to influence Chile’s 1964 and
1970 presidential elections and then supported a coup in Chile in 1973 in order to counter
the leftist policies of President Salvador Allende. In contrast, the CIA chose not to pursue
any type of regime change in Peru after a coup in 1968 put a leftist government in place.
This is despite evidence of Soviet support for the new Peruvian government through arms
sales, nationalization of the US-owned International Petroleum Company, and other
policies potentially harmful to the US.
What are the possible explanations for the divergence in US decision-making
regarding the utility of regime change? Two dominant system-level theories, realism and
liberal institutionalism, fail to adequately account for this puzzle. Realism argues that a
great power such as the US would pursue regime change in countries where one of two
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conditions were met. First, if regime change would diminish the sphere of influence of
the US’s key competitor during the Cold War, the Soviet Union, and could be
accomplished with minimal harm to US interests then the US would intervene. Further,
for hegemonic balance of power, the US would be led to intervene if its dominant role in
the Western Hemisphere was threatened. O’Rourke uses realism to explain covert regime
change: “In the context of the Cold War this meant that the United States tried to prevent
left-wing regimes from assuming power out of fear that they would spark a series of
defections from the American-led regional order” (O’Rourke 2018, 13–14, 41). Second,
if regime change would advance US economic interests by either protecting existing
interests or advancing new ones and therefore expand its economic power base, again
with minimal harm to US interests, then realism argues that the US would pursue regime
change. The cases of Peru and Chile appear to meet one or both of these criteria, and
therefore, according to the rational pursuit of power as outlined by realism, the US would
be expected to pursue regime change in both cases.
Another key theory, liberal institutionalism, argues that institutions alongside
nation-states play a critical role on the world stage and shape the decision-making of key
nation-states. Both the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations
(UN) existed at the time the US pursued regime change in Chile, and both organizations
strongly opposed such action as unlawful (Charter of the OAS, Article 19 and “The
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation,” UN General Assembly, 1970). Thus, the institutions with relevant
jurisdiction failed to prevent US regime change action in the Chilean case and therefore

6

cannot stand as a sufficient explanation for the dependent variable—regime change in
one case and not in the other.
Given the failure of system-level theories to account for the difference in the
dependent variable, this thesis seeks explanation at a more granular level: state-level
analysis, specifically the role of key sub-national actors, in this case the role played by
the CIA. If conventional wisdom is correct, the CIA, as a sub-state actor accounted for
within state-level analysis, is culpable as a key influencer in US national security
decision-making as a proponent of regime change. This thesis will examine that premise
by testing the merits of two competing state-level analysis constructs, one focused on
internal (endogenous) influences within the CIA and one focused on external
(exogenous) pressures on the CIA emanating from the American public and elected
officials, in order to explain the divergence of action in question: the pursuit of regime
change in Chile on the one hand and failure to pursue regime change in Peru on the other.
Should the analysis of organizational culture provide a stronger explanation of the
two approaches, this would provide a measure of evidence in favor of the popular
contention that the CIA was culpable as a key influencer and advocate of regime change
for US policy within the designated time frame. If instead this research determines that
internal culture played a negligible role and that the CIA was responding to external
pressures in the ways predicted by public choice theory – pursuing those activities that
would enhance its organizational budget and grow the institution’s positive reputation in
the eyes of its political masters—then the assumption that the CIA bore primary
responsibility for determining when and why regime change took place needs to be
reconsidered and a stronger measure of responsibility needs to be laid at the feet of the
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American public and their elected representatives. In order to examine the merits of these
competing explanatory paradigms, two competing hypotheses will be examined:
Hypothesis A—founded in Organizational Culture: Pronounced cultural attributes
internal to the CIA contributed significantly to CIA thinking and decision-making
regarding regime change and tipped the scales in favor of regime change in the case of
Chile and against regime change in Peru.
Hypothesis B—founded in Public Choice Theory: Exogenous pressures from the
American public and American elected officials were the primary determinants in the
focus of CIA attention, analysis, and action in the case of pursuing regime change in
Chile and inaction in Peru.
In what follows, I first review the theories often used to analyze the motivations
and events leading up to foreign intervention with an aim of regime change and
demonstrate that they do not sufficiently explain the contrast in US actions towards Chile
and Peru. Second, I examine the existing literature on strategic culture, the CIA’s culture,
and public choice theory—the foundations of my two competing hypotheses. Third, I
propose my argument, hypothesis, and observable implications, along with the
methodology I will use. I will use process tracing within the two case studies of Peru and
Chile. Then I will present the evidence and findings from my research, followed by my
conclusions.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

REALISM AND NEOREALISM
Realism was long the dominant method for explaining international relations.
Kenneth Waltz is considered the founder of neorealism, or structural realism, where—
like realism—the unit of analysis is at the state level. Frequently summarized as centering
on relative power shifts, these companion theories do not examine the differences
between states, such as those between a democracy and an authoritarian regime. In his
seminal book, Theory of International Relations, Waltz states the main belief about
states’ actions:
From the theory, one predicts that states will engage in balancing
behavior, whether or not balanced power is the end of their acts. From the
theory, one predicts a strong tendency toward balance in the system. The
expectation is not that a balance, once achieved, will be maintained, but
that a balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or another.
(Waltz 1979, 128)
Mearsheimer further expands neorealism and focuses on great power competitions. He
argues that great powers are always seeking to gain power over their opponents and that
relative, rather than absolute, power is key. He succinctly summarizes the five basic
assumptions that neorealists use in their theories: the world is anarchic, meaning that
there is no higher governing body for states; great powers possess offensive capabilities;
states are never certain of other states’ intentions; survival is the primary goal; and states
are rational actors (Mearsheimer 2001, 54–55). In essence, states’ behavior is the result of
an anarchic system in which they each constantly struggle for power and security.
During the time period studied, the US was caught up in the Cold War. This was a
great power competition in which the US and the Soviet Union were focused on shifts in
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power—hegemonic, regional, perceived, and actual. A pattern emerged across the world,
but particularly in Central and South America. If a country was perceived to be slanting
communist, the US would intervene. Guatemala in 1954 was the first major effort, but
Cuba, Chile, Panama, Haiti, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Brazil were all the focus of a regime
change operation at some point during the Cold War.
In Chile, Salvador Allende was elected in 1970 and began implementing many
leftist policies. He considered nationalization of the copper industry as a crucial first step,
due to the three US-based copper companies who were responsible for nearly 80% of the
annual copper production (Grow 2008, 95). Allende had campaigned on an antiimperialist, anti-capitalist platform and proposed the construction of a socialist country
(Grow 2008, 95). In addition to threatening American economic interests, Allende was
viewed as a communist threat. Allende was the first democratically elected Marxist
president. He renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba, and during a month-long visit
Fidel Castro helped set up the Chilean internal security agency (Gustafson 2007, 172).
Furthermore, Allende had ties to the Soviet Union, and trade between the two countries
increased. “Soviet economic cooperation . . . included generous credits to promote Soviet
exports, extensive purchases of the Latin American partner’s traditional exports, technical
assistance, and gifts for humanitarian purposes” (Blasier 1987, 38). The hegemonic
balance of power would shift in relative measure if Chile fell completely under the sphere
of influence of the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger stated in a meeting discussing Chile, “I
don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the
irresponsibility of its own people” (Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 27 June
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1970). Common thinking amongst US political and defense leaders was that Communism
was an influence to be fought against in all instances.
An attempt by the US at regime change in Chile fits within the assumption base of
competitive state behavior posited by both realism and neorealism, yet the same set of
theories fails to explain why there was no similar attempt at regime change in Peru after
the 1968 coup. The only Latin American country other than Cuba to receive Soviet arms
transfers was Peru, with the addition of almost one hundred Soviet military advisors in
Peru and over 600 members of the Peruvian military training in the Soviet Union (Blasier
1987, 43). The Velasco government “expropriated oil and other natural resources,
imposed controls over foreign imports, introduced agrarian reform” and took an antiimperialist stance against the United States (Blasier 1987, 42). Peru followed a pattern
similar to Chile’s, with anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist rhetoric from leaders and close
ties with the Soviet Union. In fact, a New York Times article called the actions of the
leftist military government in Peru “the most serious challenge to the United States in
Latin American since the Cuban missile crisis” (Browne 1969). Using a realist/neorealist
explanation, all of these factors signaled a possible shift in relative power globally
between the US and Soviet Union and regionally within the Western Hemisphere and
should have caused the US to take the same action as it did in Chile. However, the US did
not attempt a regime change operation in Peru.

NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM
Another theory of international relations that possibly explains the events in Chile
and Peru is neoliberal institutionalism. Similar to neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism
assumes the world system is anarchic. However, neoliberal institutionalists find that the
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makeup of the state—meaning type of government, such as authoritarian or democratic—
is important and that institutions are significant actors on the world stage as well.
International institutions are used by states as a signaling mechanism and serve to
enhance communication between states. They are used in the bargaining process and
provide a way to avoid war.
States choose to cooperate because they realize that they will have future
interactions with the same actors. . . .Those repeated interactions provide
the motivation for states to create international institutions, which in turn
moderate state behavior, providing a guaranteed framework for
interactions and a context for bargaining. (Mingst and Arreguín-Toft 2013,
188)
Under a neoliberal institutionalist view, institutions provide a channel for interstate
negotiations and, importantly, constrain the actions of states.
Since its foundation, the United States has been and is currently still a part of a
wide number of international organizations including the United Nations (UN) and the
Organization of American States (OAS). Both institutions oppose covert operations or
interference in the affairs of other member states. South America has long attempted to
stop the United States’ meddling in the affairs of regional states and has worked toward
international agreements such as conventions and treaties prohibiting it as early as the
1800s. A major attempt was with the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of
States in 1933. The US delegate to the convention submitted this statement for the record:
“Every observing person must by this time thoroughly understand that under the
Roosevelt Administration, the United States Government is as much opposed as any
other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal
affairs or processes of the governments of other nations” (Convention on Rights and
Duties of States, December 26, 1933).
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The 1948 charter of the OAS, of which the United States was a founding member,
clearly stated that
no State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any
other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the
State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements. (Article 19)
Despite signing the Montevideo Convention and the OAS charter, the US still covertly
intervened in countries throughout South America. Additionally, in the late 1970s, after
the events in Chile, the OAS passed a series of resolutions against covert regime change
operations. Despite these efforts, the OAS had little enforcement power, and there was no
noticeable effect on the United States as a result. Covert operations for regime change
continued. At the same time there were ongoing regime change operations in Chile, the
UN General Assembly, of which the US is a permanent member, passed “The
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation,” which states:
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of
any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of
interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or
against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of
international law.
No State may use or encourage the use of economic political or any other
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it
advantages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment,
finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere
in civil strife in another State. (1970)
Neoliberal institutionalism would argue that the disapproval of the UN and the
OAS should have had an inhibitive effect on the actions of the US. Its actions would be
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constrained by international agreements and international norms, limiting US plans for
regime change. Instead, the US might lean on institutions and other bargaining tools to
signal its intentions in order to resolve the situation with both Chile and Peru. The strong
institutional prohibitions and inhibitions against regime change would apply equally in
both cases, which means that neoliberal institutionalism does not provide an adequate
explanation for why the US refrained from regime change in Peru but not in Chile.

STATE-LEVEL THEORIES: STRATEGIC CULTURE AND PUBLIC CHOICE
THEORY
Because system-level theories fail to adequately explain the divergence in US
actions towards Chile and Peru, it is necessary to examine a wider reach of potential
variables that could impact policy decisions. Peter J. Katzenstein concludes that
realism/neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism share the same weakness—the focus
on systemic effects and not the state-level motivations and other social concepts that
inform policy (Katzenstein 1996, 13). These “motivations and other social concepts” are
the potential variables that could help explain the divergence in US actions regarding
Peru and Chile. In this thesis, I will take a closer look at the internal and external factors
through strategic culture—the combined influence of national and organizational cultures
on foreign and security policy—and public choice theory—the study of political choices
using the tools of economists and the assumption that, like markets, politics exists in an
environment of scarce resources and uncertainty.
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Strategic Culture
The decision for the US to engage in covert operations to effect regime change in
a foreign state is a policy choice. Within the strategic culture paradigm, the policymaking process is defined as “elite agendas processed through national culture, the
national policy process and organizational culture, married to material capabilities, and
inhibited or advanced by external actors” (Johnson 2006, 28). Cultural variables are
present at every step of this process.
Culture shapes practice in both the short and long term. At the moment of
action, culture provides the elements and grammar that define the
situation, that reveal motives, and that set forth a strategy for success. If
the strategy is successful, that strategy is repeated in similar situations
with similar motives. The perception of similarity of situations and
motives is a product of the culture. (Hudson 1997, 28)
The national and organizational culture aspects of the policy-making process are
the core focus of scholarship on strategic culture. Strategic culture is defined as the
following:
That set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived
from common experiences and accepted narratives (both oral and written),
that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which
determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.
(J. L. Johnson, Kartchner, and Larsen 2009, 9)
Scholarship within this literature has focused on national-level cultures as well as
organizational-level cultures to examine the impact on decision-making related to
national security. Strategic culture scholars argue that no matter the goal of the elite
decision makers’ policy choices—such as regime change—they are affected by national,
public, bureaucratic, congressional, and organizational cultures. In the instance of regime
change, strategic culture shapes the decisions at all levels in regards to covert operations
to effect regime change.
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In Jeannie Johnson’s strategic culture work studying a single organizational
culture—the US Marines—within the national culture of the US, she notes the
importance of narrowing the focus to a singular issue and then narrowing the analysis to
the actor most relevant to the policy issue (2018, 22). As noted in her work and that of
other scholars, US strategic culture is composed of competing narratives and subcultures.
The relationship between subcultures and then between the subcultures and the national
culture is still an emerging area of study. I have chosen to narrow my focus to the single
agency within the US most often cited as culpable for pursuing regime change as
policy—the CIA. As the key agency which informs and then executes policy decisions
regarding regime change, the CIA is uniquely positioned to impact regime change as a
policy tool.
A number of norms and values were raised by various authors in my review of
relevant literature on the culture of the CIA, including the following: homogeneity of
personnel, scientism, preference for secrets, drive for consensus, risk aversion, focus on
production over quality, confirmation bias, maintenance of corporate judgement, and the
selection and weighing of data based on classification (Jones and Silberzahn 2013;
Marchetti and Marks 1974; Johnston 2005; Aid 2011; Cooper 2005; Zegart 2007). In
assessing these, I narrowed the field of examination to four primary cultural traits
mentioned with consistency across the literature and validated by respected scholars. As
“pre-eminent” traits, we would expect these to surface within this thesis research as
particularly impactful if endogenous factors weighed most heavily in CIA decisionmaking regarding regime change.

16

First, the CIA values secrecy. This is illustrated by giving more weight to
classified data and the tendency to dismiss open-source intelligence. A former chairman
of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) illustrated this point when he jokingly said,
“At the NIC, we used to quip that if academics sometimes did better than intelligence
analysts, it was because the former weren’t denied access to open sources!” (Treverton
2003, 108). Analysts are on record as stating that they place more importance on data
collected by covert means (Johnston 2005, 24). Former CIA director Robert Gates spoke
of the importance of secrecy in his memoir. He attributes it to the influence of the
Directorate of Operations, the department that ran covert operations:
For them secrecy is not a convenience or a bureaucratic matter, but the
essential tool of their craft—without it, sources are executed, operations
fail, case officers’ careers are cut short, and sometimes they and their
agents do die. Their culture, their ethic were the CIA’s in 1969. They ran
the Agency bureaucratically. And few question the rightness of that.
(Gates 1996, 33)
Other studies also tie this focus on secrets and classified data back to the Cold War:
Unfortunately, information for intelligence is still treated within the old
“hierarchy of privilege” that emphasized “secrets” and was more
appropriate for a bureaucratized superpower adversary who threatened us
with large military forces and advanced weapons systems. (Cooper 2005,
12)
Second, a higher priority is placed on intelligence operations rather than analysis.
Dr. Rob Johnston is an ethnographer specializing in the cultural anthropology of work
and who worked as a staff member at the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence.
While he was there, he undertook a detailed ethnographic study of the intelligence
community, and he found that
the Intelligence Community, in its culture and mythos and in its literature,
tends to focus on intelligence operations rather than on intelligence
analysis. Open literature about the community certainly does so. Along
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with time constraints and the analytic production cycle, the private and
public focus on operations has had an effect on intelligence analysts and
analytic methodology. (Johnston 2005, 17)
Another study looked closely at the CIA and found that the operational support was
considered one of the most important duties for analysts (Cooper 2005, 29). This has the
effect of diminishing long-term strategic research and steers analysts towards reporting
rather than analyzing.
Third, a greater emphasis is placed on the production of intelligence–how many
pieces are produced and for whom–over quality. This is not to say that quality is ignored,
but it is harder to measure quality and easier to count products. In addition, the
intelligence work within the CIA is focused on responding to stakeholders and
responding to requests for information from the administration. Value is placed on being
able to quickly respond to current events and the daily production cycle, rather than longterm analytics. Tying together both the focus on operational support and importance of
secrets, analysts focus on “provable evidence,” often “at the cost of ignoring important
inferential judgements” (Cooper 2005, 27). Analysts place more emphasis on evidence
that is quantifiable or coming directly from the work of agents in the field. This means
they often do not include any conclusions or generalizations that can be drawn from their
work. In addition, promotions and performance evaluations are based on the number of
daily products they produce and how influential senior policymakers judge their work to
be (Johnston 2005, 16; Zegart 2007, 68).
Lastly, CIA culture cultivates a drive for consensus. There is a bias towards
confirming earlier views and a tendency to look for data that will confirm prevailing
hypotheses. Johnston’s ethnographic study even calls changing the official position of the
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CIA “taboo” due to the need to “avoid loss of status, trust, or respect” (Johnston 2005,
23). When the CIA deems that the national security community and the president’s
administration is unlikely to be open to a change in the official CIA position, then the
CIA is not likely to include differing viewpoints. Jones and Silberzahn recount a story
that a retired CIA officer related to them:
In 1984, the chief of the Soviet Economy Division at the CIA had
forcefully argued that the USSR would soon face a Hobson’s choice
between “guns and butter.” The former analyst reported, however, “The
problem here was that in 1984 the rest of the community—especially the
DOD—was not willing to even entertain such an idea,” so the chief’s
argument didn’t make it into CIA assessments. (Jones and Silberzahn
2013, 48)
In this case, the retired CIA officer had noted the national security community was not
willing to accept the USSR was under significant strain, which would have departed from
earlier analytic work. In CIA culture, analysts begin their efforts by using previous
versions of official CIA work, and due to the taboo on changing official positions, they
do not always question the core assumptions—an issue also referred to as confirmation
bias (Cooper 2005).
Within the literature that examines the links between CIA culture, analyses, and
operations, the focus is overwhelmingly on understanding strategic surprises or
intelligence failures. When it comes to understanding the CIA and regime change, the
literature has not yet attempted to examine the two facets in concert. The purpose of this
research is to determine whether these cultural factors play a significant role in
explaining the divergence in decision-making regarding US regime change policy in
Chile and Peru.
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Public Choice Theory
Instead of endogenous cultural factors shaping the response of the CIA, another
potential explanation for the difference in US actions toward Chile and Peru lies in the
motivations behind bureaucratic behavior caused by external pressures. Public choice
theory is founded on the assumption that politics operates in an “environment of scarce
resources and uncertainty,” with the political systems divided into four groups (Figure
1)—bureaucrats, politicians, voters, and interest groups (Simmons 2011, 52). This
environment creates several motivations for bureaucratic behavior, namely protecting an
institution’s budget and maximizing its autonomy and power.
Public choice theory in political science has its roots in the work of James
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, who took the basic assumptions that economists make
about human behavior and applied them to an individual’s participation in the political
process—an individual makes choices for utility-maximization (Buchanan and Tullock
1962). Niskanen took this further with his work on how bureaucracies are motivated to
maximize their budgets to ensure the survival of the agency, describing the interplay
between bureaucrats and their sponsoring organization as “awkward and personal—

Figure 1

(Simmons 2011, 52)
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characterized by both threats and deference, by both gaming and appeals to a common
objective” (Niskanen 1971, 24–25). Within the US government, each government agency
is appropriated a yearly budget by Congress, or politicians. This results in budgets that
are politically motivated because of the interplay between Congress, the voters, and
interest groups; bureaucracies seek to convince legislators that their budget should be
protected or increased (Simmons 2011, 78) (see figure 1).
As it did during the Cold War, today the CIA faces a unique situation. Its direct
customer is the president, but Congress controls its budget. The CIA must find a way to
fulfill the directions of the president and ensure those actions are justifiable to Congress.
Richard Helms was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from 1966 to 1973. He
recounts a conversation in early 1954 with former DCI Allen Dulles, who was also the
longest-serving DCI (1953–1961), about the importance of covert operations. Helms had
always assumed that the low cost of intelligence work was a bonus. Dulles changed his
perspective when he said,
We have to face the fact that because espionage is relatively cheap it will
probably always seem inconsequential to some of our less informed
friends on the Hill—in both houses of Congress. They’re accustomed to
dealing in billions. What kind of impression can it make when I come
along and ask for a few hundred thousand dollars and a bag of pennies?
Believe me, I know the way they think up there. If there’s no real money
involved, it can’t be important, and they just won’t pay much attention to
us. (Helms and Hood 2004, 105)
In addition to the core motivation of utility-maximization, bureaucracies also seek
to maximize the amount of autonomy they possess by competing to maintain control over
their specific policy area and responsibilities (Kunioka and Rothenberg 1993; Wilson
1989; Ellison 1995). Autonomy for a bureaucracy means that it is able to control how its
resources are used and how it chooses to carry out the tasks that it is assigned.
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Bureaucracies may also seek to maximize their power and in turn their influence in order
to ensure their survival as an organization (Rourke 1973). Created by the National
Security Act of 1947, the CIA faced significant bureaucratic opposition from the
Department of Defense and the FBI. The CIA was
a bureaucratic compromise . . . [and] limited by bureaucratic jealousies
and “Gestapo” fears. Perhaps one of the biggest concerns for the CIA was
the FBI. The FBI–CIA relationship, from the beginning, was hindered by
cultural differences, rivalries, security concerns, legal separation, and
jurisdictional “twilight zones.” By law, the two now had very different
goals, requiring different strategies and ways of thinking. (Hitz and Weiss
2004, 4)
J. Edgar Hoover was notorious for his dislike of sharing information and cooperating
with other agencies, and he remained director of the FBI until his death in 1972 (L. K.
Johnson 2007, 249). Over time there was more collaboration between the CIA and the
FBI, but it took decades to overcome the suspicion, hostility, and resistance. “Resistance
was so strong that insiders in both agencies referred to the FBI/CIA swaps as the ‘hostage
exchange program’”(Zegart 2007, 58). While the hostility might have faded, blockades to
interagency cooperation remained throughout the twentieth century, with the 9/11
Commission finding at least eleven missed operational opportunities when, if information
had been shared, 9/11 might have turned out differently (National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004).
In 1968, the CIA was barely over twenty years old. This put extra pressure on its
ability to justify its budget and existence and, as noted above, find reasons to increase its
power in order to better survive. As with the application of the CIA’s culture to regime
change operations, examining CIA’s actions through public choice theory has not been
studied. Research has been done on the CIA and FBI relationship, but only on the impact
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on specific events and operations. This thesis seeks to discover if public choice theory
can explain events within the national security sphere. Public choice theory would argue
that a bureaucracy such as the CIA would actively seek to protect its budget, ensure its
survival, and maximize its autonomy and power by responding to the priorities of those
with political and budgetary oversight—the president and Congress—who themselves are
responding to the attitudes and interests of the American people
HYPOTHESES

As shown in the literature review, system-level analyses like realism/neorealism
and neoliberal institutionalism fail to adequately explain the divergence in US actions
toward Chile and Peru; the literature on state-level theories, specifically strategic culture
and public choice, provides potential alternative explanations for US actions. As noted
earlier, in order to examine the merits of these competing explanatory paradigms two
hypotheses will be examined:
Hypothesis A—founded in Organizational Culture: Pronounced cultural attributes
internal to CIA contributed in a significant way to CIA thinking and decision-making
regarding regime change and tipped the scales in favor of regime change in the case of
Chile and against regime change in Peru.
Hypothesis B—founded in Public Choice Theory: Exogenous pressures from the
American public and American elected officials were the primary determinants in the
focus of CIA attention, analysis, and action in the case of pursuing regime change in
Chile and inaction in Peru.
Process tracing will be used to evaluate whether endogenous influences,
specifically the cultural variables currently identified within the literature as key
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components of CIA culture, or the exogenous pressures identified in public choice theory
better explain the divergence in US decision-making regarding regime change in Peru
and Chile. In examining strategic culture and the CIA’s organizational culture, the wider
literature has been narrowed to these four cultural variables:
1. The CIA values secrecy
2. The CIA values operations over analysis
3. The CIA values the number of production pieces over their quality
4. The CIA seeks for consistency across its analytical line
Given the consistency with which these variables surfaced across the literature and the
stature of the scholars advocating them, we would expect to see one or more of them play
a significant role in determining such high-profile action as when to pursue regime
change.
Public choice theory identifies several variables that would be present if
exogenous pressures were responsible for the divergence in action toward Peru and Chile.
The CIA acts to:
1. Protect its budget,
2. Ensure its survival, and
3. Maximize its autonomy and power.
In the subsequent sections, the summary of the evidence and the resulting findings will be
presented, followed by a more detailed accounting of the methodology and the steps
taken throughout the research. The methodology section will also describe how the case
studies will be presented in the subsequent sections. The remaining sections will focus on
the case studies and the conclusions drawn from the analysis.
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SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS:
The results of the thesis research show that the CIA’s organizational culture, to
the extent that it has been currently captured by scholars, fails to explain the divergence
in US regime change pursuits:
1. The valuing of secrecy, while present, played little role in determining the
CIA course of action in the two cases under consideration. Secrecy was
present in collecting information regarding both cases and in communicating
that information but did not play a role in determining the diverse outcomes. It
registers as a somewhat neutral “non-factor.”
2. Internal documents from the CIA do not reveal an overt push for operations in
either Chile or Peru. If anything, many of these analytical documents reveal a
reserve toward action and uncertainty in the right course of action.
3. The value the CIA placed on production of analytical pieces over quality is
evident across the process tracing conducted for this thesis but played the role
of catering to policymakers who were themselves concerned more about Chile
than Peru. The number of CIA internal memos and products track with
external attention on Chile and Peru within the American public media.
Again, commensurate with policymaker interest, the CIA’s assessments of
Chile are not only greater in number; they are also of higher quality than those
conducted on Peru.
4. The CIA desire for consistency does not seem strikingly evident across the
intelligence produced on Chile and Peru. The CIA shifted its analytic line and
degree of concern about Chile in response to policymakers’ concern, but not
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in Peru. Peru was the subject of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) only
three times, all of which echoed the same analysis of Peru being anticommunist and experiencing a short-term intensification of nationalistic, antiUS sentiments.
In contrast, the test for public choice theory shows strong promise as a powerful
explanatory tool for the divergence in US actions towards Peru and Chile:
1. We would expect CIA priorities to track with policymaker priorities in order to
win favor and a bigger budget. Through analysis of external pressures, CIA
efforts matched what the public’s, the president’s, and Congress’s attention was
focused on—Chile and not Peru.
2. This case would be strengthened if policymaker priorities were out of step with
actual security realities—the mission the CIA is meant to serve! As will be
demonstrated in the following sections, Peru was every bit as much a worry as
Chile, and unlike Chile it was not balanced with democratic institutions and a
watchful military. Like Chile, Peru was nationalizing many key industries and
reducing US influence, which was an economic threat to the US. Peru was also
leading the way in restoring Latin American ties with Cuba and Fidel Castro. Peru
also was more in the Soviet sphere of influence, with closer military and
economic ties than Chile. Other than a stated Marxist ideology, Allende made
fewer and slower moves towards a close relationship with the USSR. The CIA
should have analyzed it equally—invested just as much time and as many
resources to understanding it and warning about it—but it did not. Peru did not
receive the analytical investment nor the operations focus that Chile did, despite
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having equally strong Soviet ties. Using this metric, policymaker interest appears
out of step with security realities, a situation the CIA did not attempt to remedy—
despite its role as the president’s premier intelligence agency.
METHODOLOGY

As briefly discussed earlier, process tracing will be used to evaluate whether
endogenous influences, specifically the cultural variables currently identified within the
literature as key components of CIA culture, or the exogenous pressures identified in
public choice theory explains the divergence in US decision-making regarding regime
change in Peru and Chile. Process tracing was deemed the best fit for this research as the
focus is on causal inferences and is well-suited for case studies. As this is a new area of
research, it is necessary to identify and clearly show the presence of the causal
mechanism before the findings can later be generalized and applied to other CIA covert
operations that attempt to influence regime change in a foreign state.
Process tracing is an analytic tool that draws descriptive and causal inferences
from evidence gathered and analyzes events or situations as they unfold over time
(Collier 2011, 824). In this case, I am specifically using a type of process tracing for
theory testing, focusing “on the systematic study of the link between an outcome of
interest and an explanation based on the rigorous assessing and weighting of evidence for
and against causal inference” (Ricks and Liu 2018, 842). I will engage in process tracing
to the degree that it is possible to illuminate the thinking, decision-making, and actions of
the CIA through the written documents available in the public space. The process tracing
occurs through the chronological examination of the events in the two case studies, Peru
and Chile.
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To follow the chain of events, I will draw from a variety of sources as some
documents remain classified. Primary and secondary sources include the following:
government studies commissioned by the National Security Council on Chile, Peru,
communism, and Latin America; the reports from the Rockefeller Commission, House
Pike Committee, and Senate Church Committee, which were all formed to investigate
allegations of misconduct by the CIA and other members of the intelligence community;
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on Chile, Peru, and related subjects, which are the
official comments of the CIA on the pertinent subject; the memoirs of Richard D. Helms
and William Colby, former CIA directors during the time period studied; and a collection
of memos, telecon transcripts, cables, and other pertinent government documents about
the events in Chile and Peru from the 1960s through 1975 and the release of the Church
Report. In addition, data on the prevalence of Chile, Peru, and associated topics in the
media, Congressional hearings, and government documents was collected and analyzed.
An examination of over one hundred government documents, memoirs, intelligence
products, and news articles shed light on the source of key influences—internal culture or
external pressure—to pursue regime change in Chile and not in Peru.
In the documentation which follows, I will demonstrate that the CIA overrode
some of its most pronounced cultural preferences, as delineated by the scholars who
study its internal culture, in favor of pursuing analysis and action that met the
expectations of the president, Congress, and the public. Using Occam’s Razor, or the idea
that the simplest explanation is preferred, the evidence uncovered by this thesis, most
particularly the NIEs produced by the CIA itself, swings heavily in favor of public choice
theory as the more potent explanatory tool.
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The process tracing presented here will occur in three distinct stages. The first
will be a detailed look at Peru and the second at Chile. These two cases studies will be
organized in a similar fashion. For each of these two cases studies, a brief background
will be provided of the country’s history and relationship with the United States. A
timeline of key events in the time period of interest will also be included. The chain of
events in each country will be detailed in sections organized by the National Intelligence
Estimates (NIEs) dealing with Chile and Peru. NIEs “are the [Intelligence Community’s]
authoritative written judgments on national security issues. NIEs usually provide
information on the likely course of future events and highlight the implications for U.S.
policymakers” (Rosenbach and Peritz 2009, 36). As the premier CIA product and because
NIEs represent the collective opinion of the CIA, they were used to trace beliefs of the
CIA throughout the time period studied and as a method of analyzing the CIA’s response
to exogenous stimuli. Throughout each case study, CIA cultural variables and possible
external pressures will be analyzed if they appear to be present. The last stage of process
tracing will be an analysis of the difference in the two cases, the attention the media
placed on Peru and Chile, and the attention placed on Peru and Chile by the president and
Congress using the previous evidence presented on Peru and Chile.
PERU

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A former colony, Peru gained its independence from Spain in 1824. In the
nineteenth century there were several wars and altercations over border disputes, during
which Peru typically allied with Bolivia. The border disputes with Ecuador and Chile
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took decades to resolve, and by the late 1960s there was still some tension between the
countries. The leaders of Peru alternated between military leaders and elected presidents
and with civil wars, coups, and, more than once, several individuals claiming the right to

Figure 2

Presidents of Peru from 1945 to 1980
President
1945–1948 José Luis Bustamente y
Rivero
1948–1950 Manuel A. Odría Amoretti
1950
Zenon NIruega Agüero
1950–1956 Manuel A. Odría Amoretti
1956–1962 Manuel Prado y Ugarteche
1962–1963 Ricardo Pérez Godoy
1963
Nicolas Lindley Lopez
1963–1968 Fernando Belaúnde Terry
1968–1975 Juan Velasco Alvarado
1975–1980 Francisco Morales Bermudez
1980–1985 Fernando Belaúnde Terry

Background

Military
Military
Military
Military
Military
Military

Method of Gaining Office
Elections
Coup
Interim leader
Elections (only candidate)
Elections
Coup
Coup
Elections
Coup
Coup
Elections

be president at the same time. Most coups were by members of the military, in some
cases the coup’s purpose was to retake leadership and reestablish elections, whereupon
the coup leader stepped down. Or the presidents were elected by virtue of being the only
one allowed on the ballot. The military showed a propensity for involving itself in the
political processes of Peru. Of the ten governments from 1948 to 1980, seven of them
were led by military leaders. Nineteen of those thirty-two years were spent under a
military dictatorship. Since a return to elections in 1980, there has been only one shortlived coup, in the early nineties when the president of Peru dissolved the Peruvian
Congress for a little under one year.
Overall, the US relationship with Peru was friendly, even if it was not seen as one
of the more important Latin American countries. However, the 1960s saw a rising of antiAmerican and anti-imperialist feelings across all of Latin America, in part due to the
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dislike of US interventions, both
perceived and factual. An ongoing
controversy centered on fishing
rights. This concern was also
shared by several other countries
throughout South America. The
fishing industry is one of the largest
industries in Peru. The US followed
the twelve-mile rule, believing that
a country’s territorial rights only
extended twelve miles into the
ocean and past that anyone was
allowed to fish. The Peruvian
government believed that its
territory extended 200 miles into
the ocean. Throughout the 1950s
and 1960s Peru occasionally seized
US vessels operating in violation of
the twelve-mile limit with an ebb
and flow to the negotiations over
the matter.

Figure 3

Peru
1963 Fernando Belaunde Terry wins
the presidential election.
1968
October 3
Military junta led by Juan Velasco
Alvarado forces Belaunde’s
resignation.
October 9
The Peruvian government
expropriates the holdings of the
IPC.
1969
February 14
A Peruvian gunboat fires on a US
fishing vessel.
June 24
Agrarian Law (reform measure)
August 22
Seizure of the W. R. Grace and
Co. sugar plantation, which
belonged to one of the largest US
interests in Peru.
1970
April 14
Mining Law (reform measure)
May
Peruvian Earthquake
July 30
Industrial Law (reform measure)
1974
February
A deal is finally reached on the
IPC controversy
1975
August 29
A new junta forms headed by
Gen. Francisco Morales
Bermudez Cerrutti
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THE 1964 PERUVIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
A NIE was produced in 1963 titled “Political Prospects in Peru,” referred to from
here on out as 97-63 (the country/subject code and the year published). NIEs “are the
[Intelligence Community’s] authoritative written judgments on national security issues.
NIEs usually provide information on the likely course of future events and highlight the
implications for U.S. policymakers” (Rosenbach and Peritz 2009, 36). The 1963 NIE and
the others used throughout this thesis give insight into the CIA’s judgements on the
situations in Peru and Chile. This was a time of uncertainty in Peru, as a military junta
had once again intervened in Peruvian politics in 1962. This time it was to prevent
APRA, a radical leftist but anti-communist group, from gaining power after the 1963
presidential and congressional elections. The overarching conclusion of the CIA and
other intelligence professionals contributing to the NIE was that
Peru’s present political difficulties are the result of pressures for political
and social change generated in a long static society undergoing
industrialization and urbanization. These pressures have been building up
for a generation. A resolution of the consequent political tensions is not
likely to be accomplished for many years. (“Political Prospects in Peru”
1963, 1)
The CIA was aware of the tensions in Peruvian society and that it would be hard to
predict short- and long-term outcomes. In addition, it acknowledged that the military had
sufficient power and capabilities to intervene again if the election in June 1963 saw any
chance of APRA gaining power. The NIE also noted that communist and/or pro-Castro
groups were not anticipated to achieve any power in the future and the military would be
able to control any efforts to do so. A noteworthy conclusion in light of future events was
its prediction of future radical leadership (or any government that was significantly
different in goals and rhetoric than had been typical) due to the political instability.
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In the past, Peruvian Governments have been unwilling to make the
sacrifices or to risk the political liabilities of programs aimed at bringing
about fundamental social and economic change. Now, however, Peru faces
a situation in which political stability is becoming more and more
dependent on the ability and disposition of governments to respond
effectively to popular demands for economic well-being and security. This
situation augurs a breakup of the existing structure of the Peruvian
society and economy. Unless the forces of moderation are able to
bring about orderly change, radical leadership will probably get the
chance to try its methods. (“Political Prospects in Peru” 1963, 2;
emphasis added)
Fernando Belaúnde Terry was elected president of Peru after the 1963 elections. He was
expected to pursue numerous reforms in an attempt to respond to the demands of the
public for, as stated in the NIE, “economic well-being and security.”

PERU POST-COUP
The next NIE regarding Peru was not produced until 1969; however, several
important developments Peruvian society and in the US-Peru relationship occurred
during this time. Over a seven-month period in 1965 there was a communist-led guerilla
insurgency with several different groups contributing, including the National Liberation
Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR). The extent of US support is a
matter of debate as President Belaúnde and the US Ambassador to Peru J. Wesley Jones
denied the involvement of US military advisors and publicly stated that US aid was
limited to communication equipment, helicopters, and planes (Walter 2010, 73-74).
Contradicting the public statements are accounts from former CIA official Victor
Marchetti, former State Department intelligence analyst John D. Marks, and former CIA
agent Philip Agee that described the involvement of Green Berets and CIA personnel as
military advisors and the construction of a “miniature Fort Bragg,” with the CIA also
infiltrating MIR (Marchetti and Marks 1974, 110; Walter 2010 72-78). In the aftermath
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of the insurgency, the US embassy in Peru concluded that once the guerilla insurgency
was put down the Communist threat to Peru was ended (Furlong, 2021).
During the latter half of the 1960s and into the 1970s, the US-Peruvian
relationship was centered on the IPC controversy. In Peru, the state is the only one that
can own land, though exceptions exist. Such was the case for what became the La Brea y
Parinas oil field. The International Petroleum Company (IPC), a subsidiary of Standard
Oil of New Jersey, acquired it in 1924 and inherited the long-standing dispute. There
were numerous attempts to resolve the issue through the years. In 1968, Peruvian
president Belaúnde Terry reopened negotiations. At this point in time, Belaúnde was also
facing an economic crisis, as many of the reforms he had attempted since his election in
1963 were not bearing fruit, leading to a displeased country. Adding fuel to the fire,
during the negotiations a key page of a contract that promised to resolve the IPC dispute
disappeared, throwing the country into an uproar. In October 1968, General Juan Velasco
Alvarado led a military coup and formed a new government. Almost immediately he
moved to expropriate all of IPC’s Peruvian assets. The US was then faced with a tricky
situation. The Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistant Act of 1962 stated that
if a foreign country expropriates a US company without compensation, then the president
is to cut off foreign aid to that country. The Peruvian government acknowledged that IPC
had a right to compensation, but it believed that IPC owed a debt to the Peruvian
government and wanted the company to pay it first.
The NIE was produced in March of 1969, “Peru and the US: The Implications of
the IPC Controversy” (97-9), about six months after the coup led by General Velasco.
This was a special NIE, produced in response to the changes in the Peruvian government,
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to give the administration background information. While much of the NIE was regarding
the ongoing IPC controversy, it also provided several insights into the new military-led
government. The IPC controversy, as discussed earlier, was one of the causes of tension
in the US-Peru relationship. This new NIE concluded:
Because the issue is now caught up in highly emotional nationalism, the
military regime in Peru will almost certainly not meet the requirements of
US law for compensation of the IPC for its expropriated assets. Thus, if all
the forces now in train continue, the crisis with Peru over the IPC will be a
major one—perhaps disastrous for Peru and for US-Peruvian relations.
(“Peru and the US” 1969, 1-2)
This NIE warned that if US legislation was followed, there would be more anti-US
sentiments in Peru. “This would be especially true if President Velasco remains in office
(as we believe likely). . . . Under Velasco, Peruvians’ reactions might come to include
expropriations of other US businesses and even a break in diplomatic relations” (“Peru
and the US” 1969, 2). Even in the beginning stage, the CIA didn’t see signs that the new
government would be short-term, as comparable Peruvian military takeovers had been. It
added the caveat that “no one could hold office in Peru’s present and prospective climate
who appeared to give way on the IPC issue or failed to assert strong independence of US
influence.” (“Peru and the US” 1969, 3).
The NIE found that President Velasco’s cabinet included men from the extreme
right and left and that he wasn’t influenced by one side more than the other. In fact, the
CIA had evidence that
Velasco does not have the loyalty of all his cabinet ministers, particularly
insofar as his extreme views on the IPC issue that threaten Peru’s
economic development as well as its relationship with the US. Motivations
of those who dissent. . .dissent include personal ambition, general concern
for the Peruvian economy, doubts about Velasco’s ability and his tack, and
conservative views on communism and extremism generally. (“Peru and
the US” 1969, 15-16)
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This cross-section of Velasco’s cabinet reveals the differing views across Peruvian
society at the time. One common idea was the sense of nationalism and growing anti-US
feeling. In fact, the CIA characterized Peruvian diplomatic and economic relations with
the USSR as a “show of independence from the US [rather] than a serious intention to
develop a firm and close relationship,” particularly as the move to establish those
relations had begun under president Belaúnde (“Peru and the US” 1969, 3). The warning
in the NIE was that any action the US took regarding the IPC controversy would cause
hostile reactions throughout Latin American.
The danger is not so much that other governments will officially join with
Peru in condemning US policy, by such means as votes in the
Organization of American States, as that they will be stimulated to a
general sharpening of resentments they already feel, especially in the
sphere of economic relationship. Over time, a number of countries will
probably try harder to broaden their foreign economic and cultural
relations as a protection against dependence upon the US—and they care
much less about how the US views the propriety of these new
relationships. (“Peru and the US” 1969, 4)
It is clear in this statement that the CIA did not view censure from the OAS as a
significant danger to the US. It was more concerned with the spreading of anti-US
sentiment and actions that would be taken by other Latin American states. This would be
the first time US sanctions were enacted against a friendly Latin American state. In
addition, the NIE warned that “it is now conventional for most of them to describe as an
intervention any action by a foreign power which affects the internal political, social, and
economic development of a country” (“Peru and the US” 1969, 26). The focus here was
not on any specific leftist policy but the general attitude illustrated by Peru; however, the
analysis did not offer any forecast on countries that might also veer more leftist if
lingering resentments towards the US were intensified by the treatment of Peru.
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The CIA saw no risk from communism, regardless of diplomatic relations with
the USSR. Peru established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and signed a trade
agreement in early 1969, before the NIE was produced. The Peruvian Communist parties
were characterized in the NIEs as weak in leadership and organization. While many in
the regime were assessed as reformist, the NIE described Peru’s leadership as having
“uniformly anti-communist backgrounds. A number are even concerned that the regime
moved too quickly to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union” (“Peru and
the US” 1969). There was also no apparent danger from communism within Peruvian
society:
In Peruvian society as a whole, extreme leftist ideology – whether
specifically Communist or generally Marxist – has never had effective
appeal. APRA, the strongest party and the one with the widest popular
base, has been anti-communist for years; it controls most of the labor
union. . . But what appears to give leftists influence with Velasco is their
ultranationalism rather than any loyalty to a foreign ideology or interest.
We have no evidence that their influence on Velasco is different from or
greater than that or other ultra-nationalist radicals all along the spectrum.
(“Peru and the US” 1969, 15)
The CIA believed that Peru was experiencing “nationalistic blustering” and that when it
had run its course Peru would not quickly embrace communist countries to fill the
economic void left by lost US aid and investment. Aside from the historical non-support
for communism, the CIA did not provide any further analysis of why it believed Peru was
making a lot of noise but would not change anything long term. The previous NIE in
1963 had warned of the deteriorating situation in Peru and the likely breakup of the
Peruvian society and economy.
It is clear from NIE 97-63 and NIE 97-69 that the CIA did not consider there to be
any threat to US interests from communism and anticipated that whatever diplomatic
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relations were established with the USSR, they would not be influential. However, as
elaborated on earlier, the relationship with the USSR, especially the military one, did
develop to the point where, in the western hemisphere, only Cuba had a closer
relationship with the USSR (Blasier 1987, 43).
Absent from the NIE was any discussion of the expropriation of IPC holdings in
Peru after the October 1968 coup or the coastal-fishing-rights issue, during which a
Peruvian vessel fired on a US fishing boat only one month before the NIE was released
(The New York Times 1969).

PRESIDENT VELASCO’S FIRST YEAR
At the end of 1969, the CIA produced another NIE, “The Prospects for Peru” (971-69). Between the first 1969 NIE and the second, there were several developments in
Peru, including the passing of the first major reform measure focused on agrarian reforms
and the seizure in August of the W. R. Grace and Company’s sugar plantation, which
belonged to one of the largest US interests in Peru (Lowenthal 1974, 806; Olson 1975,
411). Henry Kissinger, national security advisor for President Nixon at the time the NIE
was released, summed up its conclusions: “The military is likely to retain political control
of Peru for at least several years. There is no effective opposition and none is likely to
develop in the next year or so” (Kissinger to Nixon, memo, January 8, 1970, CIA FOIA
Electronic Reading Room). This NIE echoed themes from the earlier 1969 NIE that the
Peruvians likely would not develop too strong of a relationship with the USSR. In
addition, the NIE warned that strong nationalism would continue and was a potential
cause of friction further down the road. Generally,
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the regime will remain extremely sensitive to US actions, both private and
official. If the military come to believe that US actions or policies threaten
the ultimate success of their program, they will almost certainly harden
their attitudes toward US interests in Peru and elsewhere. In these
circumstances, the regime might become much more radical than we now
anticipate and might seek to establish closer relations with communist
countries than we now think likely. (National Intelligence Estimate on
Peru 1970, 2-3)
This NIE did allow that if the US was too harsh or threatened the government’s
success, then it might drive the Peruvians closer to communism than was then
possible.
What is most interesting is that after this, there were no more NIEs produced
about Peru until the late 1970s, when it returned to civilian rule. This is despite a
deepening of Peru’s relationship with the Soviet Union. On August 25, 1970, the Soviet
deputy prime minister for foreign trade and Ambassador Pérez de Cueller signed an
agreement that provided Peru “with a $30 million credit to purchase Soviet equipment at
a low rate of interest and with the option to pay the ten-year loan off at least in part
through the importation of manufactured goods” (Walter 2010, 234–35). The following
year, in 1971, Peru signed an “economic-technological agreement with Moscow and
requested Soviet support for an irrigation project in the Olmos desert” (Brands 2010,
482). In December 1973, there were leaks that Peru planned to buy two dozen Soviet
tanks (Brands 2010, 484). In 1974, Aeroflot, the state-owned Soviet airline, began its first
commercial air service to South America with a flight to Lima (Blasier 1987, 42). In fact,
it was not until February 1974 that the IPC controversy was settled. Peru would pay $150
million to the US government, which in turn would distribute it to the expropriated firms
(as by this point other companies in addition to IPC had been expropriated), and the US
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would organize $150 million in private loans to Peru and would not block loans from the
Inter-American Development Bank (Brands 2010, 485).
Across the time horizon considered and the intelligence products available, there
is little evidence supporting the hypothesis regarding the CIA’s organizational culture,
which states:
Hypothesis A—founded in Organizational Culture: Pronounced cultural
attributes internal to CIA contributed in a significant way to CIA thinking and
decision-making regarding regime change and tipped the scales in favor of regime
change in the case of Chile and against regime change in Peru.
The variables of secrecy, operations over analysis, and quantity over quality do not
appear to be present in the NIEs. There is no evidence of any operations in Peru and with
only three NIEs between 1963 and the late 1970s, there was no push for a high volume of
regularly produced analyses. The one cultural variable that did appear to play a role was
consistency across the CIA’s analytical line. The 1963 NIE stated that Peru was anticommunist, and the first NIE in 1969 stated that Peru was unlikely to deepen its
relationship with the USSR. It is possible that this accounts for the lack of further
analytical products on Peru. From the NIEs it is unclear if there is support for Hypothesis
B, that exogenous pressures determined the focus of CIA attention, analysis, and action
with regards to Chile and Peru.
CHILE

Compared to Peru, Chile had a long history of stable democratic government.
There had only been two disruptions to peaceful handovers of presidential power since
Chile had declared independence in 1818. The most recent period of instability before the
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1973 coup had been from 1924 to 1932. As in many other countries, the communist and
socialist political parties in Chile had developed in the 1920s. However, Chile was
viewed as a leader among the Latin American countries, with economic stability and a
strong middle class.
The election of 1958 caught the US by surprise, however, when Salvador
Allende’s coalition of communist and socialist parties almost won. Running as the
candidate from the Popular Action Front (FRAP), Allende united all four of the
Marxist/communist/socialist parties behind one candidate for the first time. At some point
during the next six years before the next election, the US, through the CIA, began to
establish a framework for affecting the Chilean elections.

THE 1964 CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The CIA produced a NIE, “Chilean Situation and Prospects,” a year before the
1964 Chilean presidential election. The strong showing of Salvador Allende in the 1958
election had caught it off guard, and the administration was more concerned this time
around. The NIE reiterated the common acknowledgement that “Chile has a longstanding
tradition of respect for constitutional order and civil liberties. It has accomplished a
considerable political evolution by electoral means” (“The Chilean Situation and
Prospects” 1963, 1). It countered this with the fact that “for half the population real
wages have been declining since 1950, and a large portion of the population is ill-housed,
ill-clothed, and ill-fed. Consequently, increasing popular dissatisfaction has been
expressed in a steadily leftward trend” (“The Chilean Situation and Prospects” 1963, 1).
The NIE makes mention of the fact that there were very real concerns that the 1964
election might see Communist influence grow. The NIE saw no sign that the leftward
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trend was benefiting FRAP, Frente de
Acción Popular, or Popular Action
Front. The left-center Christian
Democratic Party grew thanks to
reformists who dislike the communistaligned FRAP (“The Chilean Situation
and Prospects” 1963, 1). In fact, it was
the Christian Democratic Party that
received help from the CIA through
funds and other political actions.
Despite these encouraging signs, the
CIA stated that it could not predict
with certainty the outcome of the
election due to the fluidity of the
situation. It did predict that even if the
Communist and Socialist FRAP did
not win there would not be violence.
“The Communists would prefer to
preserve their present legal status and
bide their time, trusting that
conservative political influences will
continue to prevent effective social
reform and that the cumulative

Figure 4

Chile
1964
March
The CIA begins its covert action
program to prevent Allende’s
electoral victory in the 1964
presidential election.
September 4
Eduardo Frei wins the Chilean
presidency.
1970
March
The US begins its covert operation
to prevent Allende from winning
the presidential election.
September 4
Allende wins a plurality in the
Chilean presidential election.
September 15
Track II begins.
October 22
Gen. Schneider is assassinated.
November 5
Allende’s inauguration as president
of Chile.
1971
December
Chileans stage the first major
protest of the Allende government,
the March of the Empty Pots.
1973
August 23
Pinochet becomes army
commander in chief and commits
the army to the coup.
September 11
A military coup led by General
Augusto Pinochet overthrows the
government of Allende.
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frustrations and resentments of the masses will eventually bring them to power” (“The
Chilean Situation and Prospects” 1963, 2). The Communist Party had been outlawed in
Chile for many years.
In the run-up to the 1964 election, the CIA’s covert operations included funding
Frei’s party, planting articles in El Mercurio, and other similar propaganda-focused
efforts aimed at ensuring the candidate most favored by the US would win (“Covert
Action in Chile” 1975, 15–17). CIA and US fears of an Allende win did not happen.
Eduardo Frei won, and CIA efforts within Chile dwindled.

LEAD UP TO THE 1970 CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
With the 1970 Chilean presidential election approaching, another NIE was
produced in January 1969, “Chile” (94-69). At this stage, the candidates for each party or
alliance had not been determined. The congressional elections happening in 1969 would
help determine that. The NIE gave a background on how Frei’s presidency had gone, the
current economic and political forecast, and likely political situations to occur. President
Frei had carried out many social, economic, and political reforms during his presidency.
However, he hadn’t reached all of his goals, and the CIA noted that factions within his
party, the PDC, were pushing for more reforms and a faster pace. In the middle of all this,
the CIA reported that “economic prospects for the short run are bleak . . . [and] the Frei
administration is already caught in a quandary of economic stagnation with rapid
inflation” (“Chile” 1969). In hindsight, the NIE accurately predicted the 1970 presidential
race. The NIE stated that
the current odds are that there will be three major candidates for the
presidency in 1970, that no one of them will secure a majority, and that the
Congress will select as president the candidate with the largest vote. If the
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Communist, Socialist, and Radical parties could set aside their
differences to agree on a candidate, he would be a strong contender,
especially in a three-man race.” (“Chile” 1969; emphasis added)
Even before the candidates were decided, with the current economic, social, and political
atmosphere, the CIA warned that the extreme left could coalesce around a strong
candidate and that it was possible he could win. Despite this, the NIE continued its
assurance that even with an administration with Communist support, the CIA believed
that “for a variety of reasons, including fear of a reaction from the military, such an
administration would be deterred from precipitate or drastic action” regarding relations
with the US and the USSR. Those reasons included:
a. An awareness of the strength of nationalist sentiment in the population
generally, in the Congress, and in their own parties—a nationalism
likely to be as strongly against subordinating Chile to the tutelage of
Moscow (or Havana) as it had been against anything it considered
subordination to Washington;
b. A realization that they needed to have and retain the support of
political elements other than those that elected them if their
administration was to be at all effective—especially since counsels
would probably be divided in their own ranks on some aspects of both
foreign and domestic policy;
c. A concern that if their administration tried to move too far and too fast,
the Chilean security forces would unseat it;
d. An apprehension (and one which Moscow probably shared) that
anything approaching a full embrace of communism in Chile would
precipitate action on the part of Argentina, Peru, the US, and other
countries—perhaps action in support of a takeover by the Chilean
military, perhaps even direct military intervention. (“Chile” 1969)
Expanding on fear of the military keeping communists in check, the NIE stated that the
Chilean military was historically antagonistic towards Communists, Socialists, and other
extreme leftists. However, the NIE did state that the military in Chile was historically
apolitical.
Rather than intervene at once to keep a Communist-supported
administration from taking office in 1970, the security forces would
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probably maintain a constant surveillance over it, particularly if it were led
by Salvador Allende, and would plan to move against it only if they were
convinced that Chilean institutions, especially their own, were threatened.
(“Chile” 1969)
The NIE also predicted that no matter which candidate won, nationalization or
expropriation of US copper companies should be expected. The manner, terms, and
timetable would of course depend on the specific administration. Any new administration
was predicted to be less cooperative, take a more anti-US stance and “explore closer ties
with Communist countries” (“Chile” 1969).
An important counterpoint to what could be considered an alarmist trend in the
CIA’s analyses was the rebuttal to NIE 94-69 that the ambassador to Chile, Edward
Korry, widely disseminated. He described why he took this step:
I am taking the unusual action of commenting on it in some detail because
of the distorted view it could provide of the results of the nationwide
Congressional elections in a week’s time and because, frankly, I am
dismayed by the lack of attention to words and their significance. Or
perhaps the words were chosen to make some kind of case which is even
worse since then all scholarliness is negated. (American Embassy Santiago
to Department of State, Memo, February 22, 1969, CIA FOIA Electronic
Reading Room)
Ambassador Korry’s central claim was that the situation was not as black or white as the
NIE appeared to present it and that there were positive aspects in the situation. He
countered the statements that the Chilean economy was not doing well with the fact that
the stock market of Santiago has just reached the high recorded level ever
(in constant prices) and the highest volume of transactions in at least five
years, the culmination of a steady rise during the past six months.
(Embassy to State)
Despite fears of an Allende win and the 1969 NIE stating that it was not clear who
would win the 1970 presidential election, there was not a concerted long-term effort to
prevent an Allende win. Helms’s memoir states that he brought it multiple times to
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Nixon, who declined to say it was necessary (Helms and Hood 2004, 399). The Church
Committee report, a special congressional committee formed to investigate alleged illegal
actions of the US government’s intelligence activities, recounted that on April 17, 1969,
at a 40 Committee meeting, “it was suggested that something be done, and the CIA
representative noted that an election operation would not be effective unless it were
started early. But no action was taken at that time” (‘Covert Action in Chile” 1975, 20).
The 40 Committee monitored CIA covert action during this time period. It was only in
March 1970 that the CIA was authorized to spend $125,000 on “spoiling operations”—
essentially just enough money to hopefully cause dissension among the coalition
supporting Allende; in June, $300,000 was added to the budget and covered posters,
planted news stories, leaflets, and pamphlets on the dangers of an Allende victory for
Chilean democracy (Helms and Hood 2004, 400). These efforts were broadly focused on
anti-Allende messaging, not a directed effort to support one particular candidate as
before.

THE 1970 CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The last NIE before the Chilean presidential election was released July 30, just
over a month before the election on September 4. The 1969 NIE had predicted that the
race would be too close for there to be a clear winner and that the Chilean Congress
would end up deciding the victor. The forecast in the 1970 NIE, “The Outlook for Chile,”
remained inconclusive, even just a month before the election. Out of the three candidates,
Alessandri, Tomic, and Allende, Congress would choose between the top two. In contrast
to its earlier tone regarding Allende, this NIE started to take a more extreme stance on
implications of an Allende presidency. In the 1969 NIE it had stated that Allende would

46

be “deterred from precipitate or drastic action” (“Chile” 1969). The 1970 NIE a year later
stated that
Allende’s socialist state would be a Chilean version of a Soviet style East
European Communist state, secured with the help of the Chilean
Communist movement. . . . While we judge that Chilean democracy is
likely to survive over the next two or three years, it will be tested in the
near future and with even greater severity over the next decade. The
greatest threat to stability and constitutional order would come from the
policies of an Allende administration. Another threat might arise from the
extra-constitutional reactions of its opponents, including the military. No
matter who is elected, the tensions in Chilean society are likely to increase
before they diminish. (“The Outlook for Chile” 1970)
The NIE clearly saw the potential for Allende to threaten US interests and Chilean
stability. In addition, the fact that the continued neutrality of the Chilean military was
called into question is important. In October of 1969, there had been mutiny by members
of the army due to conflict with Frei’s appointees, a decrease in salaries due to inflation,
and subpar, outdated equipment. The NIE states that “the Chilean Armed Forces . . . have
a renewed awareness of their potential political power and a greater inclination to use it”
(“The Outlook for Chile” 1970). It did, however, clarify that it did not believe that the
Chilean military would repeatedly intervene and become reminiscent of other Latin
American countries. On the international stage, the CIA believed that “an Allende
administration would be openly hostile to US interests or at best neutral” (“The Outlook
for Chile” 1970).
The final votes were close, meaning that the Chilean Congress would vote for the
next president, choosing between the two candidates with the most votes. As a matter of
precedent, the winner of the popular vote was chosen. Allende had received 36.3 percent
of the vote compared to Jorge Alessandri, who received 35.3 percent. At this time, Nixon
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directed the CIA to prevent Allende’s accession to office. These efforts were divided into
two operations.
Track I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee,
including political, economic and propaganda activities. These activities
were designed to induce Allende’s opponents in Chile to prevent his
assumption of power, either through political or military means. Track II
activities in Chile were undertaken in response to President Nixon’s
September 15 order and were directed toward actively promoting and
encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende. (“Covert
Action in Chile” 1975, 23)
The run-off vote in Congress was scheduled for October 22. Central to efforts to
prevent Allende’s election was the attempt to kidnap Gen. Schneider, who, as leader of
the army, would prevent a coup to remove Allende from power. Schneider was shot
during the attempt and died a few days later. The Chilean Congress voted almost
unanimously for Allende. Allende was inaugurated and almost immediately moved to
nationalize industries and began implementing other reforms. The US maintained its
propaganda efforts at this time, largely through El Mercurio (“Covert Action in Chile”
1975, 29).

CHILE UNDER ALLENDE
In 1971, another NIE, “The Outlook for Chile Under Allende” (94-71), followed.
The CIA summarized the Allende Administration with this:
In the first nine months of his government of Popular Unity,
President Salvador Allende has moved skillfully and confidently toward
his declared goal of building a “revolutionary, nationalistic, and socialist
society on Marxist principles.” His problems are mounting; but he is still
firmly in control, most of his policies enjoy wide popular support, and his
ability to manipulate the levers of power is growing. His strategy and
timetable are impossible to predict in detail. (“The Outlook for Chile
Under Allende” 1971)
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Despite having been faced with a potential Allende administration since 1963, the CIA
had not exerted serious effort at forecasting his policies and likely paths. The NIE
summarized the numerous problems that Chile was facing economically with inflation
and shortages. The CIA stated that Allende did not have enough political strength to
make it through the difficulties and that “consolidation of the Marxist political leadership
in Chile is not inevitable” (“The Outlook for Chile Under Allende” 1971). It is here
where the CIA began to talk about more drastic options that Allende might take, such as
replacing Congress or finding a way to avoid the 1973 congressional election. Despite
having stated the past two years that the Chilean democracy would survive and that
Allende would not take drastic action, the NIE did not discuss why the earlier reasons the
CIA gave as to why that wouldn’t happen disappeared.
Though [Allende] would almost certainly prefer to adhere to constitutional
means, he is likely to be impelled to use, and to rationalize, political
techniques of increasingly dubious legality; eventually he is likely to feel
it necessary to employ his considerable Presidential powers to change the
political system so that the UP coalition can perpetuate itself in control.
The factors operating for and against this outcome are nearly evenly
balanced; the actual outcome could be dictated by quite fortuitous
circumstances at some key moment. (“The Outlook for Chile Under
Allende” 1971)
This NIE was the first more serious discussion of the Chilean military intervening
in the government, including leading a coup. While the NIE clearly stated that “the
Chilean military are not now disposed to political intervention,” it did allow that further
economic deterioration and “severe social unrest” could lead to military action. It listed
additional circumstances, such as “a blatantly unconstitutional action by Allende, an
effort to suppress the opposition by force, or especially a move which the military
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considered a threat against the armed forces as an institution” (“The Outlook for Chile
Under Allende” 1971).
Contrasting with other messages within the NIE, 94-71 also discussed the pattern
of Allende’s relationships with Communist or socialist powers, including Cuba. Allende
did not break ties with any former allies and did not “subordinate Chilean interests. . . .
The new pattern reflects Allende’s desire to chart an independent nationalist course for
Chile both within the hemisphere and on the world stage” (“The Outlook for Chile Under
Allende” 1971). While ties with Communist countries were viewed as being likely to
continue to increase, it would not necessarily be on the military front.
Chile is less likely to seek large-scale military aid from the Communists
partly because the equipment desired by the Chilean Armed Forces is
obtainable in the West, partly because the military leaders in Chile prefer
to deal with Western military establishments, and partly
because Allende sees no advantage in needlessly antagonizing the US in
such a sensitive matter as Western Hemisphere security. If the USSR were
to request maintenance facilities for its navy in Chilean
ports, Allende would probably find it difficult to oppose, given his
probable need for Soviet economic help. But we doubt that he, or the
Chilean military establishment, would tolerate a permanent Soviet
military presence in the country. ((“The Outlook for Chile Under
Allende” 1971); emphasis added)
The NIE forecasted US-Chilean relations were still likely to continue to deteriorate in
some manner over the course of Allende’s presidency. The 1971 NIE also raised
concerns over repercussions throughout Latin America similar to concerns raised about
Peru. As the 1971 NIE put it,
Labor, intellectuals and other such groups will look to Chile for
inspiration. A leftist front on the Chilean model is already organized in
Uruguay to participate in this fall’s election. It has little chance of
winning, but if it attracts a substantial minority of the Uruguayan
electorate, it will encourage the formation of similar fronts elsewhere, e.g.,
in Colombia or Argentina. (“The Outlook for Chile Under Allende” 1971)
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TWO YEARS INTO ALLENDE’S PRESIDENCY
The US continued to watch Chile closely. The NIE produced the following year,
“Chile: Alternatives Facing the Allende Regime” (94-72), did not offer any new insights
into the situation, repeating the same concerns over the potential for Allende to stay in
power and turn Chile into a socialist state. Of note is that there is a segment that dealt
with the likelihood of Allende being removed from office. The NIE stated that the
chances of this were fairly small since the military did “not now appear willing to mount
a coup” (“Chile” 1972). Many of the reasons echo earlier NIEs in that the military
tradition in Chile was to not become involved in the political process.
A vital factor in any decision by the military to intervene would be their
perception of the popular consensus at the time. Among the contingencies
that would increase the likelihood of action by the military would be a
blatantly unconstitutional act by Allende, real or threatened breakdown in
public order, or threats to the military’s institutional integrity. (“Chile”
1972)

THE END OF ALLENDE’S PRESIDENCY
The last NIE (94-73) before the September 11 coup in 1973 was released roughly
three months earlier on June 14, 1973. The 1973 NIE, “Chile,” continued to lay out
potential outcomes in Chile. The three likely paths were (1) a political standoff where
Allende was blocked from any political gains and things remained in limbo for three
years until the 1976 presidential elections; (2) Allende could manage to consolidate his
power to the point where there was no serious opposition; or (3) the military could step in
and repudiate Allende’s government or even remove him from office through a coup. The
conclusion a mere three months before the coup was that “at this juncture, a political
standoff seems the most likely course of development. The chances for consolidation or
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repudiation, while less likely than those for standoff, appear roughly equal, one to the
other” (“Chile” 1973). However, the NIE stated that there was evidence of coup plots
within the military and a growing sense of urgency within the leadership for some sort of
action against Allende. In early August, the commander of the army, General Prats, was
replaced by General Augusto Pinochet. A month later, he orchestrated a coup which
resulted in the death of President Salvador Allende and a military dictatorship led by
General Pinochet that lasted until 1990.
There are few instances of CIA organizational culture variables surfacing as
impactful across CIA analysis or operations regarding Chile. Both a value for secrecy and
a preference for operations over analysis do not appear throughout the CIA’s Chilean
operations or in the NIEs. It is possible to view the high number of analytic products as
valuing production over quality, but it is more likely a measured response to keep abreast
of the situation and anticipate the future. The CIA did not seek for consistency across its
analytical line, however, with Allende’s election marking a major turning point. The
1963 and 1969 NIEs were vague about the implications of an Allende presidency. They
were confident that Chilean democracy would be tested but that it would survive, in part
due to the watchful eye of the Chilean military. They would not involve themselves with
policy, but would likely step in if Allende went too far in turning Chile into a socialist
state. Starting in 1970, however, the NIEs took on a much more foreboding tone. Gone
were the forecasts that democracy would survive. It was acknowledged as an option, and
the CIA did state that a Marxist Chile was not inevitable. There was a serious discussion
on the options the Allende had to turn Chile communist. If the CIA had been consistent,
this type of analysis would have been present in earlier NIEs. There are differences in the
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type of threat posed by Chile as a potential Marxist state and the threat of Peru as antiUS, with close Soviet ties; however, there is no common cultural variable that can
account for their difference in treatment by the CIA. The rest of the thesis will trace
exogenous pressures from the 1960s and 1970s to test if the difference in policy can be
better explained by public choice theory.
EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON THE CIA

The exogenous pressure on the CIA was traced in three steps. First, the attention
the public was paying to Chile, Peru, and their respective leaders—Allende and Velasco.
This was done through a careful analysis of news articles whose subject was Peru, Chile,
Velasco, or Allende. The second step would be to identify if the US government had
differences in the focus on Peru or Chile that could be linked to the change in the public’s
attention. This was done through examining Congressional hearings and a database
search of government documents. The last step would be to take a broader examination of
the difference in the CIA’s focus between Peru and Chile.

THE PUBLIC
Public choice theory asserts that the public exerts pressure on the bureaucracy
through their role as voters or interest groups who influence both the president and
Congress. Based on the current world situation, the public was concerned with the Soviet
Union, communism, and the Vietnam War.
The New York Times has digitized its articles back to 1851. A dataset was
compiled of all the articles that mention Peru, Chile, Salvador Allende, and Juan Velasco
Alvarado from 1960 to 1976. Those years cover the key events in question and are used
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throughout my research. Beginning with the year 1960 allows a better view of the
average attention paid to the selected terms, rapid increases or decreases, incremental
growth or decline, or any other generalizations. In addition, Peru had presidential
elections in 1963, allowing a comparison between the Peruvian 1968 coup and the
elections. Beginning with 1960 also allows for a comparison of the two Chilean
presidential elections. The latter dates were when both countries had a leftist, antiimperialist government ascend to power. Including the earlier dates allows a comparison
in attention between elections in which the status quo was kept and when leftist
governments took control. 1976 was chosen as the end date because, for Chile, the
investigation into the CIA’s actions had ended and the Rockefeller Commission, the
Senate Church Committee, and the House Pike Committee had all submitted their reports.
In Peru, President Velasco was ousted due to his ill health and replaced by another
Peruvian general, Francisco Morales Bermúdez in 1975. By tracking reporting up
through 1976, we are able to account for a comparison between the two Peruvian military
coups and the public’s concern with the events to see if the public paid any consistent
attention to the Peruvian changes in government.
As seen in figure 5, there was always more public interest in Chile than in Peru.
There is a distinct downward trend in the number of articles about Peru. The coup at the
end of 1968 led to many reform measures being implemented in 1969, which likely
contributed to a slight increase in the number of articles in 1969. In contrast, the number
of articles concerning Chile were much more varied; however, starting with the lower
number of articles in 1968 and 1969, the number of articles began an upward trend as
Allende grew in relevance and throughout his presidency. The average number of articles
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per month in the twelve months preceding the September 11, 1973 coup, was 69. The
month after the coup, saw 213 articles published – an increase of 208.7%. Based on the
average number of articles, without the coup there still would have been over 800 articles
which is an increase from the 688 articles about Chile in 1972. This shows that, of the
two cases, Chile received both a greater amount of external/public visibility and for a
longer amount of time. This is mirrored in figure 6, with the external visibility of
Salvador Allende and Juan Velasco Alvarado. While not as drastic a difference as seen
with the keyword searches “Chile” and “Peru,” there were considerably more articles on
Allende than on Velasco, with interest peaking in 1973, when he died during the coup,
and articles slowly declining as the Congressional committees conducted hearings for
their reports.

THE US GOVERNMENT
When examining the visibility and concern of each case study within the US
government, I turned to two main sources—Congressional hearings and the US
Declassified Documents online database. First, I identified the Congressional hearings
that concerned themselves with either Peru or Chile in the previously established
timeframe (1960–1976). There were eight hearings for Peru and thirteen for Chile. Of the
nine hearings about Peru, three were for ambassador nominations, four were about US
aid (all within the timeframe 1960–1965), leaving just one that dealt with US relations
with Peru after the 1968 coup and the seizure of IPC property by the ruling junta. Out of
Chile’s thirteen hearings, seven of the hearings were about human rights and refugees
after the 1973 Pinochet coup, and one was regarding an ambassadorial nomination. The
remaining five dealt with Allende’s presidency and the CIA’s involvement with his
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death. Based on this information of one hearing about the situation in Peru versus five
about Chile and Allende, Congress was more concerned about Chile than Peru. This
matches what was found in the data from the New York Times, where the public remained
interested in Chile and Allende for a more sustained length of time than they did about
Peru and Velasco.
A broader study of the US government’s focus was also important. The U.S.
Declassified Documents Online collection is compiled of documents from presidential
libraries and executive agencies, including the Department of State and the Central
Intelligence Agency. The documents include intelligence studies, policy papers,
diplomatic correspondence such as cables and memos, and various other types of
government documents. In addition to using the collection to gather primary source
material, the database offers the ability to compile search-term-frequency data, including
the number of documents by year and the percentage of documents in the collection using
that term. Peru and Chile were used as search terms, with an expanded time frame of
1950–1976.
Contrary to expectations, the percentage of documents regarding Peru and Chile
was about the same until 1970 as seen in figure 7. A common argument is that the
government was always more concerned with Chile as a stable democracy than Peru;
however, this finding offers a different perspective that, at least among classified
documents, the difference between the two countries was negligible. The percentage of
documents changed with Allende’s election with an increase in documents about Chile
compared with Peru, and then more drastically in 1973, when documents about Chile
comprise almost 10% of that years declassified documents.
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Supporting the claim that Peru and Chile received equal attention within the US
government for many years is the number of documents as seen in figure 8. It is not until
1964, the year of Chile’s presidential elections, that the number of documents does not
follow previous trends. Due to the insurgency that was put down in 1965 and the
resurgence of the IPC controversy in 1967, Peru sees a general increase in documents, but
after a high point in 1967, sees a downturn before seeing less than 50 per year from 1970
onwards. Chile’s highest number of documents is actually from 1964–1967. There could
be any number of reasons for fewer documents after Allende’s election, including that
some documents still remain classified. The comparison between the documents for Peru
and Chile from 1950–1976 does show that from 1964 onwards there was a difference in
how the government internally approached Peru and Chile. Before, Peru and Chile
received an equal amount of focus, but after 1964 the majority of the years see more
documents concerning Chile being produced. The number of Peruvian documents
increased sharply in 1967, the year that the Peruvian Congress declared that the IPC
properties belonged to the Peruvian government. After this the number of documents per
year about Peru decreases again and levels out at a lower number than before. This
contrasts with documents about Chile, the number of which increases and then stays
consistently higher than documents about Peru.

THE CIA
Narrowing the focus of external factors even more, a list of NIEs concerning Peru
and Chile was compiled. As stated earlier, NIEs “are the [Intelligence Community’s]
authoritative written judgments on national security issues. NIEs usually provide
information on the likely course of future events and highlight the implications for U.S.
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policymakers” (Rosenbach and Peritz 2009, 36). As the premier analysis product, the
NIEs indicate which national security issues the CIA was most focused on. At first
glance, it is clear that more emphasis was placed on Chile, with seven declassified NIEs
compared to only three for Peru. While this does not include the many reports and memos
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As is evident in the data from the New York Times, the US public had lost interest in Peru
after the initial coup by President Velasco. This in turn led to more attention being placed
on Chile and Allende by the president and Congress, evident in the number of documents
produced and the percentage of US documents concerning Chile. In response to its
customers’ concerns, the CIA focused more on Chile than on Peru.
CONCLUSIONS

This thesis was intended to be the first step in building a state-level theory of CIA
involvement in regime change operations. As shown in the literature review, system-level
analyses like realism and neoliberal institutionalism fail to explain the divergence in US
actions toward Chile and Peru; the literature on state-level theories, specifically strategic
culture and public choice, offer reasonable alternative approaches to explain US actions. I
proposed two hypotheses:
Hypothesis A—founded in Organizational Culture: Pronounced cultural attributes
internal to the CIA contributed in a significant way to CIA thinking and decision-making
regarding regime change and tipped the scales in favor of regime change in the case of
Chile and against regime change in Peru.
Hypothesis B—founded in Public Choice Theory: Exogenous pressures from the
American public and American elected officials were the primary determinants in the
focus of CIA attention, analysis, and action in the case of pursing regime change in Chile
and inaction in Peru.
Of the two hypotheses, public choice theory offers the most potential as an
explanatory tool for CIA involvement in regime change. Scholars should be more careful
in describing the CIA as a regime change advocate and more carefully delineate the

61

factors involved in covert operations. Evidence from this thesis appears to indicate that
CIA involvement in regime change was the result of public perception and the priorities
of politicians, not of internal CIA cultural factors. The events in Chile were clearly more
visible to the public and Congress, in addition to having a sustained visibility. While
there were spikes in attention to the events in Peru, they were short-lived and interest
remained small. For this research, I used the NIEs to gauge how much pressure the CIA
was feeling from the external visibility of the situations. A larger number of documents
were found on Chile. In addition, there was no mention of Peru in any of the documents
the Church Committee produced while an entire staff report was dedicated to covert
actions in Chile. Strongly motivated by survival, increasing organizational power, and
budget, the CIA prioritized those areas that were visible to its most important customer—
the president—and to the ones who controlled its budget—Congress.
The answer to the puzzle of why the US paid more attention to the events in Chile
than Peru is in many pieces. One piece is to examine the events within the context of the
Cold War. This period of time during the Cold War saw a large shift. In the Soviet Union,
Khrushchev was ousted in 1964 and replaced by Leonid Brezhnev, who oversaw a period
of détente with the United States. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT) began
in 1969, lasting until 1972. SALT II negotiations began soon after, lasting until 1979.
Despite this, Soviet defense spending increased during this period. In addition, the Cold
War had transformed from a bi-polar struggle into a tri-polar standoff. The Sino-Soviet
Split reached a crisis in 1969, with a seven-month border conflict, which brought the two
powers to the brink of war. It was during this time that Kissinger and Nixon began
diplomatic relations with China again, culminating in Nixon visiting China in 1972 and
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reversing previous foreign policy with regards to China and Taiwan. These major shifts
in the status quo of the Cold War required more attention and focus and were the
principal consideration behind any foreign policy decision.
As an extension of the Cold War, the Vietnam War was drawing significant
attention domestically and internationally. In Vietnam, 1968 began with the Tet
Offensive. Just a short year later, President Nixon announced the gradual withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Vietnam. Conflict was spread all across the southeast Asian region,
including Laos and Cambodia. Much of U.S. foreign policy was concerned with
countering Soviet influence and focused on southeast Asia not South America during the
time period studied.
The US relationship with Peru and Chile provides another piece of the puzzle.
The economic situation, especially concerning the IPC controversy was incredibly
complex and had started years before. While the expropriation of the IPC and the
eventual resolution occurred during the time period studied, the scope and focus of the
study did not include a deeper look at previous events. As an ongoing issue, it is possible
that public attention was not as interested in Peru. The US also chose to not invoke the
Hickenlooper amendment, which allowed the US to cut off foreign aid to Peru. This
action likely kept tensions from continuing to rise.
In addition to economic issues being less threatening, the US embassy in Peru felt
that the communist threat in Peru ended when the insurrection in 1965 was put down
(Furlong, 2021). Furthermore, after the coup the Peruvian military began talking about
retaking the territory lost to Chile after the War of the Pacific in 1883. The US did not
want to sell tanks and supersonic jets to Peru that could enflame the situation and
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declined their request; therefore, the US was not concerned when Peru turned to the
Soviets to purchase military armaments instead (Furlong, 2021). In short, Peru was
deemed less of a threat ideologically and economically.
Perhaps the simplest answer to the puzzle of why the US acted in Chile and not in
Peru, yet the most comprehensive, is that Salvador Allende was the first Marxist elected
by a democratic country. Between the Vietnam War, détente, and the Sino-Soviet Split,
there were major events elsewhere that required attention from the US and the
implications of an Allende presidency drew more attention than a coup that was less of a
threat ideologically.
This thesis focused on the power of public choice theory and organizational
culture as explanatory tools. While public choice theory proved stronger, it would be
wrong to discount organizational culture entirely and that is an area where this thesis
could be expanded upon. Another area for research would be to expand on the analysis of
the New York Times articles and declassified documents by analyzing the subjects to
identify trends. These are only two potential avenues for further research within this
thesis; however, an important next step is to repeat this process with other cases across
CIA and US history. For instance, there was also a lack of action by the US in Bolivia
and Ecuador where there were military coups. As an agency that is required to be
impartial to policy choices, it is important to understand exactly how the CIA responds to
external pressures in order to be aware of potential biases. As an area that has not yet
been prevalent in scholarly literature, more research and analysis is vital to understanding
the impact that bureaucratic behavior and motivations have on matters of national
security.
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